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Subjective probability seems to function the other way around. |
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What do you mean? |
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While algorithmic probability declares objects improbable if complex, situations are subjectively improbable if they are too simple! |
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Oh, as in the lottery examples? |
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Yes. Improbable if simple. |
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Not in the case of magic.
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You’re right.
Now I remember.
Improbability is due to causal complexity in that case. |
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Or rather to the difference between causal complexity and description complexity. |
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Yes. That’s how unexpectedness is defined. |
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I was amazed by all the consequences of this definition. |
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You mean, concerning interest, relevance, aesthetics and all the other predictions? |
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Yes. Relevance is my favorite one. |
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Why especially relevance? |
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Because it defines intelligence, according to Turing’s imitation game. |
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Well, if I follow you correctly, relevance, and therefore complexity drop, define the way we think? |
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Yes. It’s as if our mind was some kind of compression machine.
That’s something! |
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Indeed, it’s quite unexpected (oops) to see our minds put in equations that way! |
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It seems you’ve become a supporter of compressionism now. |
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Ha ha, yes, I guess I’m officially converted. |
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Me too! |
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